We explore when finite epistemic models are definable up to simulation or bisimulation, either over the basic multi-agent epistemic language L or over its extension L C with common knowledge operators. Our main results are the following:
1. Bisimulation to finite epistemic states (i.e., pointed models) is not definable in L.
2.
Global bisimulation to finite epistemic models is definable using model validity in L.
3. Simulation by finite epistemic states is not always definable, even over L C .
4. We identify a class of epistemic models called well-multifounded for which simulation to finite epistemic states is definable over L.
The first two results contrasts with that of van Benthem that finite epistemic states are definable up to bisimulation in L C by so-called characteristic formulae.
Our results have applications in the logical specification of multi-agent systems. Characteristic formulae, which define states up to bisimulation, fully capture all modally definable properties of models, and can for example be used to give complete calculi for validity over fixed structures. Meanwhile, simulation is a 'substructure' relation which is appropriate for epistemic logic, as it preserves positive existential formulae. Simulation formulae are useful in giving a dynamic description of models subject to epistemic actions.
Introduction
Modal logic is the framework for formalising knowledge representation and areas in artificial intelligence as diverse as distributed computing, reasoning about programs, verifying temporal properties of systems, game theoretic reasoning, reasoning about knowledge and belief, and specifying and verifying multi-agent systems. One of the reasons for the popularity of modal logic in such diverse fields is its semantics: the notion of states, or worlds, together with that of a relation between them, is the key concept in Kripke models, on which modal logics are interpreted. Such worlds may model the state of a distributed system, a processor, or a machine, or a situation in a game or a protocol. The binary relations indicate for instance a possible transition (in time, or by a computation) between states, or they may represent some attitude of an agent: some state may be desired by an agent, some states may form the goal of an agent, or, as is the interpretation for epistemic logic, states may be conceived as indistinguishable by the agent.
Kripke models are a great tool for designing and modelling complex situations, and a modal language provides a perfect way to verify properties about the systems obtained. To give an example, consider the simplest multi-agent system one can envisage to reason about information: we assume to have two agents, a and b, and one atomic fact, say p. Suppose the information about the scenario to be modelled is the following: p is true, although neither a nor b knows it. One model that comes to mind to represent this situation is M 1 depicted in Figure 1 , where the 'actual state' is s 1 . Given this state where p is true, each agent considers another possible state where it is false. However, this raises many questions: is this the model of the scenario, or are there alternative models? How do we tell they are different? For instance, would the models of Figure 2 be 'equally good' ? It of course depends on what is meant by that criterion: yes, all three models satisfy the description of the scenario (p ∧ ¬K a p ∧ ¬K b p is true in all of their designated states s i ), yet each model verifies some additional and different information about which the scenario description was ambiguous, or, rather, under-specified.
The notion of bisimulation [3] tells us when two structures are essentially the same, at least as far as modal logic is concerned; in this sense it plays a role analogous to, say, an isomorphism between algebraic structures. Following this analogy, a simulation [1] would play the role of a homomorphism; simulations are defined like bisimulations without the 'back' clause, and as in the case of isomorphisms, bisimulations can be defined as simulations whose inverses are also simulations. These relations preserve a fragment of the modal language known as the positive existential formulas [3] .
Referring back to our examples, we want to specify that we are actually in model M 2 , in state s 2 : Can we specify that in our object language? Because the modal language is bisimulation-invariant we can hope at most to describe models up to bisimulation. However, it is not immediate that this can be done and, in fact, it is usually not the case. For example, finite unimodal K-states cannot be defined up to bisimulation over the basic modal language, but over PDL they can be [2, 9] .
Over the class of transitive models we do have that finite pointed 1 models are definable up to bisimulation in the basic modal language, but greater expressive power is needed to define simulability [6] . Over S5 we should expect the situation to become much simpler because accessibility is an equivalence relation [8] -indeed, both simulability by and bisimilarity to finite models are modally definable in this class -but once we consider multiagent models, things become trickier, as we shall see.
Our goal is to explore when finite epistemic models are definable up to simulation or bisimulation, either over the basic modal language L or the language L C enriched with common knowledge operators. Our main results are 1. simulability is not definable in general in L C (Theorem 7.1);
2. finite epistemic states are not definable up to bisimulation in L (Theorem 6.1);
3. finite epistemic models are definable up to bisimulation by model validity in L (Corollary 8.1), and 4. there is a class of epistemic models we call well-multifounded for which simulability is definable over L (Theorem 9.1).
Epistemic logic
We consider the basic language of epistemic logic L = L A , where A is a nonempty finite set of 'agents' (in this paper mainly a and b) and whose formulas are built from propositional variables in a finite 2 set PV using the Boolean connectives ∧ and ¬ (all other connectives are to be defined in terms of these) and the unary modal operator K a for each a ∈ A. We write M a as a shorthand for ¬K a ¬.
The language L C is an extension of L which introduces an operator C B ('common knowledge') for each B ⊆ A.
We are interested in interpreting L and L C over epistemic models, which are tuples
where |M| is a non-empty set, ∼ M a collection of equivalence relations
We will usually omit the subindex on ∼ M unless this may lead to confusion. The valuation · M is extended to arbitrary formulas in the standard way for Booleans. For the epistemic modal operator we have
and C B ϕ M is the largest subset F of |M| such that, if s ∈ F , b ∈ B and t b ∼ s, then t ∈ ϕ M . For t ∈ ϕ M we also write M, t |= ϕ, and if M, t |= ϕ for all t ∈ |M| we write M |= ϕ and say ϕ is valid on M. An epistemic state (or pointed epistemic model) is a pair M, s where M is an epistemic model and s ∈ |M|.
It is well-known [5, 8] that multimodal S5, given by the axiomatization below, is complete for such interpretations:
Axioms
All propositional tautologies
Rules: Modus ponens and Necessitation:
The reason we work with a finite set PV of propositional variables is that one cannot define models up to bisimulation in the presence of infinitely many variables using a finite formula. This is because, given a formula ϕ, there are only finitely many variables appearing in it, so there is some variable p which does not appear in ϕ. Then, given a pointed model M, w such that M, w |= ϕ, we can obtain a new non-bisimular (and non-simulated) model M by varying the truth-value of p on w; clearly we still have M , w |= ϕ, as the variables appearing in ϕ are unaffected, yet the new model is not bisimilar to the original.
Simulation and bisimulation
In this section we define simulations and bisimulations, and some notions and results linking these to the logical language. Given models M and N , a point x ∈ |M| simulates y ∈ |N | if there exists a simulation S ⊆ |M| × |N | such that x S y; we will write M, x N , y . We also say that M, x simulates N , y , or that N , y is simulated by M, x .
If a bisimulation B exists between M and N such that x B y, we will write M, x N , y or x y if this may not lead to confusion. We write M N (in words, M and N are bisimilar to each other) if there is a bisimulation between them with domain |M| and range |N |. This is called a total bisimulation.
A well-known fact [3] is that:
, then x and y satisfy the same formulas of L.
Although we are mainly interested in "full" simulations and bisimulations, we occasionally need an approximation to a bisimulation known as a k-bisimulation, defined as follows: Definition 3.2. Let M, N be epistemic models, x ∈ |M|, y ∈ |N | and k ≥ 0. We define x k y (x is k-bisimilar to y) if x and y satisfy the same set of atoms and either k = 0 or the following variant of the 'back and forth' conditions holds: Recall that the modal depth of a formula ϕ is the nesting number of modal operators appearing in ϕ.
We also have a variant of k-bisimulation which preserves formulas of L C . Here it is convenient to introduce the 'derived accessibility relations' B ∼ . If M is an epistemic model for a set of agents A and B ⊆ A, we define
where, in general, for a relation R, R * denotes the transitive closure of R.
Definition 3.3. Let M, N be epistemic models, x ∈ |M|, y ∈ |N | and k ≥ 0.
We define x C k y (x is k-bisimilar to y for common knowledge) if x and y satisfy the same set of atoms and either k = 0 or the following variant of the 'back and forth' conditions holds: 
Notions of definability
In this section we shall define the notions of definability that are at the core of our present inquiries. We shall state them in the general case of a formal language Λ, where for our purposes Λ ∈ {L, L C }. It will be convenient to introduce factual descriptions of states. Recall that we are assuming that the set PV of propositional variables is finite. Thus we may form the conjunction of all literals true on x; more precisely:
If the context is clear, we also write τ x . The Greek letter τ is exclusively used to denote factual descriptions.
It should be clear that if any epistemic state N , y satisfies τ M,x , it follows that x and y satisfy the same set of propositional variables.
Definition 4.2 (Distinguishing formula).
A distinguishing formula between two subsets S, S of an epistemic model M is a Λ formula δ S,S such that S ⊆ δ S,S M whereas S ∩ δ S,S M = ∅. The Greek letter δ is exclusively used to denote distinguishing formulas.
If S = {x} and S = {y} we write δ x,y and we say that δ x,y distinguishes x from y in M; and for a formula that distinguishes a state x from all other (nonbisimilar) states in the model M we write δ x , or δ M,x . For a distinguishing δ x we have that for all t in M, M, t |= δ x implies M, t M, x . Distinguishing formulas will play a role in the construction of characteristic formulas, next on our list.
Definition 4.3 (Characteristic formula). Let Λ ∈ {L, L
C } and M, x be an epistemic state.
1. We say a formula ϕ ∈ Λ defines bisimilarity to M, x (or that it is a characteristic formula of M, x ) if, for every epistemic state N , y ,
2. We say a formula ϕ ∈ Λ defines M up to bisimulation (or that it is a characteristic formula of M) if, for every epistemic model N ,
3. We say bisimilarity to M, x (respectively, M) is definable over Λ if there exists ϕ ∈ Λ such that ϕ defines bisimilarity to M, x (respectively, M).
If ϕ is a characteristic formula of M, x we write χ M,x or χ x . (Similarly, for χ M .) The Greek letter χ is exclusively used to denote characteristic formulas.
We shall need an an analogue of Definition 4.3 for simulation.
Definition 4.4 (Simulation formula).
Let Λ ∈ {L, L C } and M, x be an epistemic state.
1. We say a formula ϕ ∈ Λ defines simulation by M, x (or is a simulation formula for M, x ) if, for every epistemic state N , y ,
2. We say simulation by M, x is definable over Λ if there exists ϕ ∈ Λ such that ϕ defines simulation by M, x (respectively, M).
If ϕ ∈ Λ defines simulation by M, x we write σ M,x , or σ x . The Greek letter σ is exclusively used to denote simulation formulas. 
Definability results for unimodal epistemic logic
We shall now discuss some well-known 'warm-up' results concerning unimodal S5 states. The formulas τ M,x are useful in establishing the following:
Proposition 5.1. If A = {a} and M, x is any epistemic state for A, then bisimilarity to M, x is definable over L A .
Proof. Let M, x be any epistemic state. Since there is only one agent, we write ∼ instead of a ∼ . Then, we may set
It should be observed that, while the set {x : x ∼ x} may be infinite (we are not assuming finiteness for this result), the set {τ M,x : x ∼ x} is necessarily finite (as there is only a finite number of propositional variables), and thus our conjunctions are well-defined.
Then, we leave it to the reader to verify that χ M,x satisfies the desired property. Later we shall use formulas with a similar structure, which we will analyze in more detail.
Note that the above construction relies heavily on the particularly simple form of single-agent S5 models, for indeed we need only give factual descriptions of accessible states. The situation becomes more complex for weaker modal logics. In [6] , one of the authors gives a fairly explicit construction of bisimulation formulas for unimodal S4 models; however, their existence in theory follows from a result of van Benthem in [9] , if we observe that unimodal PDL is equally expressive to the basic modal language over the class of transitive frames.
In [6] it is also shown that simulation by a finite, unimodal S4 state is generally not definable over L. However, the situation is different over unimodal S5, and indeed simulation is also defined over this class.
Proposition 5.2. If A = {a} and M, x is any epistemic state for A, then simulation by M, x is definable over L A .
Proof. As before, let M, x be any epistemic state. Now we set
We leave it to the reader to verify that σ M,x defines simulation by M, x .
Note that in the right conjunct (the big conjunction) of the proof above, the part M τ M,x can be omitted, as under S5 conditions it already follows from the left conjunct τ M,x . This slightly more succinct formulation will be used in the multi-agent result for simulation, Theorem 9.1.
Undefinability of bisimulation in L
Once we pass to the multi-agent case, the situation becomes much more complex. First of all, it turns out that bisimulation is typically not definable over L.
Theorem 6.1. There exists a finite, two-agent epistemic state M, x such that the property of being bisimilar to M, x is not definable over L.
Proof. The models we shall describe are depicted in Figure 3 .
Given N < ω, consider the model S N consisting of 2N + 1 states
if n is odd and
Let E be a model with two worlds e 0 , e 1 , both indistinguishable to both agents and with
yet an easy induction shows that
Now suppose there would be a formula ϕ E,e0 such that for all states M, x , we would have M, x |= ϕ E,e0 iff M, x E, e 0 . Let k be the modal depth of ϕ E,e0 . Since every model is bisimilar to itself, we would have E, e 0 |= ϕ E,e0 . Also, by (2) we would conclude S k , s 0 |= ϕ E,e0 , which would then yield, by our assumption, that S k , s 0 E, e 0 , which contradicts (1).
The models E and S 3 ; p-states are black.
Undefinability of simulation in L C
Following results from [6] , one may expect that if bisimulation is undefinable over L, then so is simulation. However, in this setting we obtain an even stronger negative result; for indeed, simulation cannot be defined even over the language with common knowledge. For this, we need to define two models, which we call 'spiders'. These models will satisfy the same formulas of L C , but will not be simulated by the same states.
Definition 7.1 (Spiders). We define two models H, H as follows (see also Figure 4 ): Then consider the spider H , defined as H but with { n, ω : n ∈ Z \ {0}} added (this set represents two 'infinite legs' of the spider).
Let us see that H, 0 and H , 0 satisfy the same set of L C formulas:
Proof. In view of Propostion 3.3, it suffices to check that H, 0
We leave the details to the reader, but the key observation is that {a,b}
Theorem 7.1. The property of being simulated by a finite epistemic state is not definable over L C .
Proof. Let E be as in the proof of Theorem 6.1. We claim that:
The first claim is just Lemma 7.1. Now, being simulated by E, e 0 is equivalent to there being an infinite sequence x n : n ∈ Z of possibly repeating states such that x 0 = 0, x n+1 a ∼ x n if n is even, x n+1 b ∼ x n if n is odd, and x n satisfies p if and only if n is odd. To see this, suppose that N is some model, and S ⊆ |E| × |N | is a non-empty simulation. Then, there is some x 0 ∈ |N | such that e 0 S x 0 . Now, because S is a simulation and e 1 a ∼ E e 0 , there is x 1 a ∼ x 0 such that e 1 S x 1 ; similarly, e 1 b ∼ E e 0 , so there is x −1 b ∼ x 0 such that e 1 S x −1 . Now, to find x 2 we note that e 1 b ∼ E e 0 , so because S is a simulation there must be x 2 b ∼ x 1 with e 0 S x 2 . Continuing in this fashion (in both directions) we obtain x n for each n. Note that the value of x n may repeat, but this is not important. Now, some inspection will show that H provides such a sequence (on its ω-branch). More precisely, we define a simulation S ⊆ |E| × |H | with e 0 S 0 and e i S n, ω if and only if i ≡ n (mod 2).
However, H does not have such an infinite sequence, so E, e 0 H , 0 but E, e 0 H, 0 , as claimed.
Definability of total bisimulation
Recall that in the proof of Proposition 5.1, we used a formula of the form
This is the basic structure we need to define bisimilarity in general, although due to the simplicity of unimodal S5 structures, we typically need something more involved. More generally, we may describe a state s in a modal structure using a formula χ s using the factual description τ s of s, and a description χ t of every accessible state t (corresponding to the Forth clause of bisimulation) together with a statement that nothing else is accessible (corresponding to the Back clause). This gives us a recursive pattern of the form
where, in turn, each χ t has a pattern similar to χ s . This is the basis of the 1970s Yankov-Fine construction to describe finite modal tree structures [3] . However, for such a construction to yield a welldefined formula, we need for models to be well-founded in a way that is typically not the case for epistemic models; the unwinding of an S5-structure is an infinite tree.
In some cases, we may remedy this if we have infinitary modal operators or an infinitary language at our disposition:
1. In [2] it is shown that any state M, s has a characteristic formula in the modal language with infinitary conjunctions and disjunctions.
2. In the subsequent [9] characteristic formulas are given for finite models in PDL.
3. Van Benthem also shows in [10] that finite epistemic models are definable up to bisimulation in L C .
4.
In an older setting, [4] tackle the issue for CTL and CTL * and provide characteristic formulas for finite models in CTL.
The modus operandi in [2, 9] is to introduce fresh variables p s for a given modal structure, one for each state s, and describe a fixpoint using these fresh variables p s . This serves to characterize modal structures but at the price of going to an extended language with an infinite stock of variables. The explicit purpose of these fresh variables is to make each state unique. (This is not guaranteed if we take the state descriptions τ s above. And that is a problem, namely if there are states s and t with the same valuation but with different accessible states, such that in the Jankov-Fine pattern some M τ u may be false in t but true in s.) The implicit justification for this procedure is that it does not matter if we change a modal structure in the value of 'irrelevant' variables (in an S5 setting one could imagine a variable to be irrelevant if it is commonly known to be true or false, so that-psychologizing-it can be removed from the vocabulary in which agents reason about their uncertainty; this is also useful when the set of propositional variables is infinite). But this approach does not serve our present goals, for two reasons: firstly, we want to give a characteristic formula in a given logical language, i.e., with a given set of propositional variables, and secondly, the procedure of introducing fresh variables makes bisimilar states s and t non-bisimilar, even at the Atoms level.
So, to distinguish a state from other states, state descriptions τ s are too weak but fresh variables p s are too strong. There is a way in between. Given a finite multi-agent S5 model, iterating the (multi-agent version of the) JankovFine construction above up to the number of states in a model, for each s we can construct a distinguishing formula δ s in L. Clearly, this construction may be costly. Van Benthem also mentions the distinguishing formulae δ s in [9] , in the setting of PDL. Another result in [9] is that every finite M, s has a characteristic formula in PDL with the Kleene *, using the existence of such distinguishing formulas δ s . In [9] only the unimodal case is considered, over arbitrary K-models.
This can be generalized to a set of PDL-action labels a, b, . . . ; we fill in the details here (see also [10, 13] ). Given a finite set of action labels a 1 , . . . , a n = A, we can see the corresponding dynamic modal operators [a 1 ], . . . , [a n ] also as epistemic modal operators K a1 , ...., K an ; and instead of the Kleene-* applied to the choice between all these operators (a crucial detail), i.e., (a 1 + ... + a n ) * , interpreted by the accessibility relation (R a1 ∪ · · · ∪ R an ) * , we take the common knowledge operator C A . Given that translation, we can adapt 
Consider the binary relation B given by s B t whenever, for all n < ω, s ∈ δ n t M . It is not too difficult to check that B is a bisimulation (it is essential here that M be finite), from which it follows that, given s t, there exists n(s, t) = n < ω such that s ∈ δ n t M . Letting N be the maximum value 4 of n(s, t), we see that the formula δ With this we may prove our main definability result for bisimulation. Proof. Let M be finite, and without loss of generality, suppose it contractionminimal, i.e., M is not bisimilar to a smaller model. Also assume that it is generated. Define
Then, the following are equivalent, for any N , t :
Since M |= χ M , any bisimilar model N also satisfies χ M . For the converse, If N |= χ M , then we can define a relation
given by x B y if and only if y ∈ δ x N . Then, it remains to be checked that B is a bisimulation; indeed, if x B y and x a ∼ x, then we have that y satisfies δ x and, since N , y |= δ x → Forth x (use χ M ), it follows that y satisfies M a δ x , and thus there is y a ∼ y such that y satisfies δ x , i.e., x B y . Thus B satisfies Forth.
A similar argument shows that B satisfies Back as well, and hence it is a bisimulation. Note that, by Theorem 6.1, the use of common knowledge is essential. Indeed, [10] defines characteristic formulas as follows:
We observe that common knowledge is used rather weakly, namely in the form of a single occurrence of that operator. Compare this with Theorem 8.1 above, that does not have the common knowledge operator. We further point out the resemblance with the distinguishing formula construction in the proof of Lemma 8.1. There, we use the Yankov-Fine construction iteratively up to the size of the finite model, and with building units the state descriptions. Whereas for the characteristic formula we use the Yankov-Fine construction as a conjunction over all states in the model, closed by common knowledge, and with building units the distinguishing formulas.
Simulability and well-multifounded models
Now we turn our attention to a setting in which simulability does become definable:
Definition 9.1 (Well-multifounded models). An epistemic model M is wellmultifounded if there does not exist an infinite sequence of states x n a(n)
∼ x n+1 such that for all n, x n = x n+1 and a(n) = a(n + 1).
The model M 1 from Figure 1 is well-multifounded, the models M 2 and M 3 from Figure 2 are not.
Theorem 9.1. If M is well-multifounded and finite and x ∈ |M|, then simulability by M, x is definable over L.
Proof. Suppose that M is well-multifounded and finite. We first note that given two distinct states x, y ∈ |M|, there is at most one agent a ∈ A such that x a ∼ y; otherwise, this would immediately give us an infinite loop x, y, x, y, x, . . . violating well-multifoundedness. Now, pick x * ∈ |M|. We will show, by induction on the size of M, that there is a formula σ M,x * defining the property of being simulated by M, x * .
The base case is when M is a singleton model. Here the simulation formula is τ M,x , i.e., the conjunction of literals true in x.
Suppose, then, that a formula σ X ,x exists defining the property of being simulated by X , x whenever X is well-multifounded and has strictly fewer states than M.
Consider
i.e., the model obtained by deleting x * from M. Because N is smaller than M, for every x ∈ |N | there is a formula σ N ,x which defines simulation by N , x ; that is, such that given any epistemic model Y and y ∈ |Y|, N , x Y, y if and only if Y, y |= σ N ,x . Recall that τ x is the conjunction of all literals (propositional variables or their negation) which are true on x. Define
We claim that σ M,x * defines being simulated by M, x * over the class of epistemic models, that is, given any state Y, y we have that
We consider each direction separately.
Left-to-right. Assume that M, x * Y, y * , so that there is a simulation S ⊆ |M| × |Y| with x * S y * . We need to show that Y, y * |= σ M,x * . Clearly y * ∈ τ x * Y . It remains to check that, if
Because S is a simulation, for any such x there is y a ∼ Y y * such that x S y. We need to show that y ∈ σ N ,x Y to establish our claim; but by our induction hypothesis, it suffices to observe that S |N | is a simulation (the Forth condition is clearly preserved by restricting to submodels of the domain), and by assumption the existence of such a simulation implies that y satisfies σ N ,x .
Since x was arbitrary, looking at the definition of σ M,x * , it follows that y ∈ σ M,x * Y , as desired.
Right-to-left. Suppose that y * ∈ σ M,x * Y ; we need to construct a simulation S ⊆ |M| × |Y| such that x * S y * . In fact, for our inductive argument to work it is convenient to define S so that it is a function; let us call a simulation which is a function an immersion. Let B be the set of all agents a such that there is x = x * with x a ∼ M x * . For each a ∈ B pick a fixed representative d(a) with the property that d(a) a ∼ M x * . Let N a define the submodel of N generated by d(a). We claim:
1. Each N a is well-multifounded. To see this, note that well-multifoundedness is obviously preserved under taking submodels.
2. N a does not depend on the specific choice of d(a); that is, for all x a ∼ M x * , the model N a equals the submodel of N generated by t.
is contained in the submodel generated by x, and it follows that the two are equal.
Note that, if z ∈ |N a | ∩ |N b |, we have a path connecting d(a) to z and another connecting d(b) to z (this is the definition of 'lying in the generated submodel'). 'Pruning' the path if necessary, we can assume that points do not repeat and the agents connecting consecutive points are distinct.
These two paths give us a 'loop' which begins on x * and passes through d(a), then z, then d(b) and back to x * ; we can then run this loop infinitely many times to obtain a sequence violating well-multifoundedness.
We conclude that there is no such z. Now, for every a ∈ B and x a ∼ x * , we have that y * ∈ M a σ Na,x Y (by σ M,s * ); in particular,
Thus we can pick y(a)
We claim that S is an immersion.
Clearly it preserves propositional variables. Also, it is easy to see that S is indeed a function, since we have only added the pair x * , y * to a disjoint union of functions with disjoint domains.
It remains to check that the Forth condition holds. Since S is a function, the Forth condition becomes:
To prove this, pick x a ∼ M x . There are essentially three cases we must consider.
1. x, x ∈ N . They both lie in some N a , since these models are generated; but then S a is an immersion, so S a (x) a ∼ X S a (x ).
2. x = x * , so that S(x) = y * . By transitivity of
which is what we needed.
3. x = x * . Then x ∈ |N a |, and because these sets are disjoint it is the only agent for which this holds. Thus S(x) = S a (x). Now,
so by transitivity x a ∼ M d(a) and, because S a is a simulation,
as desired.
Applications
Descriptions of interpreted systems Computing characteristic formulas for models employing distinguishing formulas may be costly, because the distinguishing formulas need to be computed first, using the iterative construction up to the size of the model (see Lemma 8.1) . For specific S5 model classes the characteristic formulas may be simpler, especially when the factual descriptions are then already distinguishing formulas. We describe two examples: hypercubes, and card deals. Static interpreted systems [5] consist of a domain of global states, where each global state is a collection of local states, one for each agent. If agents only know their local state, the description of the global state (i.e., the description of the valuation) is a distinguishing formula in the Kripke model for that interpreted system. Each agent a has an associated set of local state values L a , and given n agents a global state (gs) is an n-tuple gs = (l 1 , . . . , l n ), where l 1 ∈ L 1 , . . . , l n ∈ L n (with possibly an additional so-called 'state of the environment' -we will overlook the complications of that). An interpreted system IS is then any subset of L 1 × . . . L n , and the maximal L 1 × . . . L n is called a hypercube of dimension n. Under those circumstances, we can associate an epistemic model with an interpreted system [7] . An agent knows her local state (that is why it is called a local state) and an agent cannot distinguish global states wherein she has the same local state. This induces an equivalence relation:
For the valuation, we can consider a propositional variable for each local state value (or another more efficient encoding).
We consider again the shape of the characteristic formula in the proof of Theorem 8.1, where we now take care to separate the factual (purely propositional) part from the negative part (only M a operators), and from the positive part (only K a operators).
We can see this as a three-part description facts ∧ ignorance ∧ knowledge For interpreted systems we first observe that the factual descriptions are distinguishing formulas.
As different states in the epistemic model for IS stand for different global states, we can identify a state t with a global state gs. For convenience we can identify a factual description τ t with the description of that global state as a conjunction of local state value, i.e., if gs = (l 1 , . . . , l n ) then let the formula gs (strictly, τ gs or τ t for t corresponding to gs) stand for the conjunction (l 1 ∧. . .∧l n )∧ l i =li ¬l i .
The ignorance and knowledge for each agent is a function of its local state. By shuffling the conjuncts of the conditions τ s in the knowledge and ignorance parts of the characteristic formula somewhat, we get:
The factual part says that one of all global states in the interpreted system IS must be the case. This is therefore a large disjunction of factual descriptions. The negative part says that an agent considers all global states possible wherein she has her actual local state. The knowledge part says that each agent knows her local state.
player a has x a cards, and players only know their own cards, what the cards in the deck are, and how many cards each other player has. The uncertainty of the players about the other players' cards is again an interpreted system. The set of local states for player a is the set of possible hands of cards for that player. We do not get the full hypercube, because the local state of a reveals something about the local state of another player b: if a holds card x, b cannot hold x. So, there is dependency of local state values: if the local state (hand) of player a is one in which a holds x, all global states are ruled out wherein another player b holds that card. The resulting scenarios may be viewed as hypercubes with holes. As an example we depict the model for three players a, b, c each holding a single card from a pack of cards {0, 1, 2}. Similarly to the case for hypercubes, we can describe the structure by a characteristic formula, as follows. Let propositional variables c i stand for 'card c is held by player i', and factual descriptions ijk for the conjunction (i a ∧ j b ∧ k c ) ∧ (¬j a ∧ ¬k a ∧ ¬i b ∧ ¬k b ∧ ¬i c ∧ ¬j c ) [13] .
The modular form of characteristic formulas for such interpreted systems is an advantage, because information growth in the form of model restriction, as usual for such systems, allows us to focus on the changing parts of the formula: factual and positive knowledge are always preserved, and only the negative knowledge, the ignorance, is reduced. However, this is not the case for more complex forms of information change / epistemic actions, as we will now see.
Simulation and growth of information Simulation is intimately related with epistemic actions. Roughly speaking, epistemic actions are events by which agents learn new information, and given some initial epistemic model this may result in another epistemic model. The initial epistemic model always simulated by that other epistemic model. More precisely, given an epistemic model M, s , if epistemic model N , t is a submodel of a model bisimilar to model M, s , then there is some epistemic action taking M, s to N , t , and M, s is simulated by N , t , that is, N , t M, s . Note that this is more general than saying that epistemic model N , t is a submodel of M, s , e.g. model M 3 in Figure 2 (page 3) is simulated by M 1 in Figure 1 (page 2), but M 1 is not a submodel. More interestingly M 2 is also simulated by M 1 . For a discussion on such matters, see [12] .
Thus defining submodels up to simulability helps us interiorize dynamics into the syntax by fully describing the effect of certain epistemic actions on a model. This could be used to turn a static description of a model into a dynamic one, by describing which epistemic states may result after executing those actions which are available to the agents.
For an example of a simulation formula, let us take the model M 1 in Figure  1 again (we recall that the model has a designated point s 1 where p is true). Applying the construction in the proof of Theorem 9.1, a simulation formula is p ∧ M a ¬p ∧ M b ¬p. This formula defines simulation by M 1 . This means that any model simulated by M 1 will satisfy the formula, or, in terms of ignorance, any information state with some informative development resulting in M 1 will already have that ignorance: all values for p were already considered possible for both agents, and of course p was already true. Now this is somewhat different for the case of models that are not definable by simulation, such as M 2 (we recall that it is not well-multifounded). In such a case, the notion of simulation can be approximated within the language by the preservation of positive existential formulas, for example via a recursion similar to that of Yankov-Fine where σ However, as Theorem 7.1 shows, this recursion would only capture an approximation to simulation, even if we take the infinite conjunction of all σ n x for n < ω.
Conclusion and further research
When building multi-agent systems applications, in case you want to perform an action in the model, you often want to apply the action 'right here in the model'. Unless you have nominals, you can enforce this by preconditions that distinguish that state from other states. This can be done in logic without common knowledge. However, there are different cases wherein you want to pin down the current state including all its epistemic aspects. 'Only under exactly these conditions, this action will apply'. Then you need a characteristic formula and that can only be done in epistemic logic with common knowledge. This significant distinction may not always be observed. We hope that our results, already known in the communities of PDL and CTL, may therefore contribute to logical hygiene in epistemic applications.
For future research, it is worthwhile to determine the complexity of the computation of distinguishing formulas, the building stones of the characteristic formulas. Complexity worries were already uttered in [4] -but we do not know of any subsequent resolution. In the case of static interpreted systems where factual descriptions (i.e., global states) are already distinguishing, this is clearly more efficient. However, such systems consist of large numbers of global states with many local state variables.
